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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: CONFINING
JUVENILES WITH ADULTS AFTER GRAHAM AND MILLER
ABSTRACT
Thousands of juveniles are currently confined with adults in detention and
correctional facilities throughout the United States. Juveniles confined in adult
facilities face grave dangers to their safety and well-being, including
significantly higher rates of physical assault, sexual abuse, and suicide than
their counterparts in juvenile facilities. These dangers and other conditions of
juvenile confinement with adults give rise to concerns of constitutional
dimension. In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Supreme
Court has created categorical rules prohibiting the imposition of certain
punishments on entire categories of offenders as cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida, in which it held
that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole violates the
Eighth Amendment when applied to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
offenses, and its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, in which it held that
mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes violate the Eighth
Amendment when applied to juveniles, open the door to challenge the
constitutionality of the confinement of juveniles with adults.
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INTRODUCTION
Standing at 5'2" and weighing 125 pounds, Rodney Hulin entered a Texas
state prison at the age of 16 after being convicted of second-degree arson.1
Rodney had set a neighborhood dumpster on fire, which resulted in less than
$500 worth of property damage.2 Almost immediately after entering prison,
Rodney was raped by another prisoner.3 Although he begged to be moved out
of the general population, Rodney was returned to the same unit after receiving
medical treatment for the first rape.4 As he continued to be beaten, raped, and
forced to perform oral sex on other prisoners, he repeatedly requested transfer
out of the general population.5 On one occasion, he wrote a prison official:
“I’m afraid to go to sleep, to shower or just about anything else. I am afraid
that when I am doing these things, I might die at any time. Please, sir, help
me.”6 After seventy-five days in prison, Rodney hanged himself in his cell.7
Throughout the United States, thousands of juveniles8 are confined with
adults in adult facilities, which include jails9 and prisons,10 rather than in
juvenile facilities, which have been designed and designated for juveniles.11
1 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, REPORT 69 (2009), available at http://nprec.us/files/pdfs/
NPREC_FinalReport.PDF.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. (quoting Testimony of Linda Bruntmeyer, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (July 31, 2002),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281fe329f3&wit_id=4f
1e0899533f7680e78d03281fe329f3-2-1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prison officials finally moved
Rodney into a segregated unit, and his suicide occurred after this transfer. Id.
8 Although states define the legal term “juvenile” differently, for purposes of this Comment, a juvenile
is any individual under the age of eighteen.
9 The term “jail” refers to a correctional facility that primarily holds “pretrial detainees and/or prisoners
sentenced to a term of one year or less.” AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS standard 23-1.0(i), at 1 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/
midyear2010/102i.pdf. A correctional facility is “any place of adult criminal detention . . . operated by or on
behalf of a correctional or law enforcement agency.” Id. standard 23-1.0(e). “The term ‘correctional facility’
does not include a facility that serves solely as . . . a juvenile detention facility, or a juvenile correctional
facility.” Id.
10 The term “prison” refers to a correctional facility that primarily holds prisoners who have been
sentenced to at least a one-year term of incarceration. Id. standard 23-1.0(j).
11 See TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES
9 tbl.6 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim09st.pdf; HEATHER C. WEST, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES 24 tbl.21 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf. Juveniles generally enter adult facilities as a result of
being charged and prosecuted in adult criminal court, rather than in the juvenile justice system. JAMES AUSTIN
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Rodney’s experiences highlight some of the dangers faced by juveniles
confined with adults. Juveniles, who continue to develop cognitively,
emotionally, and physically, are especially harmed by confinement with
adults.12 Juveniles confined in adult facilities, which are not designed to meet
the special needs of juveniles and are generally staffed by individuals who
have not been trained to work with juvenile populations, have less access to
rehabilitative programming and educational services than their counterparts
confined in juvenile facilities.13
Adult inmates pose some of the greatest risks to juveniles held in adult
facilities. In an adult facility, a juvenile faces a far greater risk of harm,
including physical and sexual assault, than a juvenile housed in a juvenile
facility.14 While adult facilities in some states separate juveniles from adult
inmates, many do not.15 Children as young as thirteen may be held alongside
adult offenders.16 This Comment argues that confining children under the age
of eighteen with adults violates the Eighth Amendment17 to the United States
Constitution.18

ET AL.,

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 182503, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT, at ix (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf. Juveniles may be
transferred from juvenile court to criminal court through a waiver procedure, or states may set the age of the
criminal court’s original jurisdiction to be under eighteen. Id. at 3.
12 See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 142–43.
13 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 66–67; see also Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of
Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 227, 256 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (noting that correctional officers “appeared
to be focused exclusively on enforcing rules, maximizing surveillance, and demonstrating their power” and
that, “[b]ecause the prisons were primarily custodial facilities, most [inmates] were not engaged in programs
aimed at their personal or social development”).
14 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–8.
15 Id. at xi, 45.
16 Id. at 41.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”). Although the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments only
applies following an individual’s conviction, the majority of federal circuits use an Eighth Amendment
framework to assess whether conditions of pretrial confinement violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments. See infra Part III.A.
18 To file a suit against a prison official alleging an Eighth Amendment violation, an individual
incarcerated in a state facility may bring a civil action for deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
mechanism by which the majority of constitutional claims are brought against state prison officials. Katherine
Robb, What We Don’t Know Might Hurt Us: Subjective Knowledge and the Eighth Amendment’s Deliberate
Indifference Standard for Sexual Abuse in Prisons, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 705, 707 n.19 (2010).
Specific issues relating to § 1983, including standing, immunity, and the impact of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), are beyond the scope of this Comment. An individual
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In one strand of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has established categorical rules banning certain sentencing practices for
particular offenders or offenses.19 Prior to its decision in Graham v. Florida,
the Court had only established categorical rules prohibiting the imposition of
the death penalty on either certain offenders20 or for certain offenses.21 In these
decisions, the Court analyzed whether a national consensus existed against
applying the death penalty to the categories of offenders or offenses under
consideration and then exercised independent judicial discretion to assess
whether the death penalty was cruel and unusual in each circumstance.22 In
Graham, the Court expanded its jurisprudence when it applied this analytical
framework to hold a noncapital punishment, life in prison without the
possibility of parole, unconstitutional as applied to juveniles convicted of
nonhomicide offenses.23 In 2012, the Court relied upon this line of cases
involving juveniles in its decision in Miller v. Alabama, in which it held that
mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes as applied to juveniles
violate the Eighth Amendment.24 The Court’s decision in Graham and its
emphasis on juveniles’ distinctive characteristics and diminished culpability in
Roper v. Simmons, Graham, and Miller open the door to challenge other
noncapital punishments and conditions of confinement applied to juveniles,
including confinement with adults.
Part I of this Comment discusses the grave dangers arising from the
confinement of juveniles with adults, including the significant risk of physical
and sexual assault, high rates of suicide, and lack of access to critical services.
Part II examines the developmental and legally recognized differences between
juveniles and adults. Part III explores the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence with a focus on the two-part analytical framework adopted by

incarcerated in a federal prison may bring a Bivens suit per Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Specific issues related to a Bivens suit are beyond the scope of this Comment.
19 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
20 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile defendants);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants).
21 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446–47 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on defendants
convicted of nonhomicide offenses).
22 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“The beginning point [of the Eighth Amendment analysis] is a
review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have
addressed the question . . . . We then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment,
whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment . . . .”).
23 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
24 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
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the Court in its establishment of categorical rules prohibiting the imposition of
certain punishments on entire categories of offenders or offenses. Part IV
argues that incarcerating juveniles in adult detention and correctional facilities
where they come in contact with adult offenders constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and details recommendations for
remedying this constitutional violation.
I. THE CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES WITH ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part examines the grave dangers faced by thousands of juveniles who
are confined with adults in jails and prisons in the United States each year.
Section A outlines the increased risks and harm that juveniles face when
confined in adult facilities, rather than juvenile facilities. Section B
demonstrates that, despite the continued detention and incarceration of
thousands of juveniles in adult facilities each day, a national consensus against
confining juveniles with adults is forming.
A. The Dangers of Confining Juveniles with Adults
Juveniles confined in jails and prisons face serious threats to their health
and well-being. Juveniles in adult facilities face a high risk of physical and
sexual abuse from guards and other inmates, and this abuse may have
devastating and long-term consequences for the victimized juvenile.25
Juveniles confined in adult facilities also have dramatically higher rates of
suicide than do their counterparts housed in juvenile facilities.26 While
confined in adult facilities, juveniles lack access to services critical to their
continued development and are particularly vulnerable to criminal
socialization.27
Juveniles face significantly higher rates of physical and sexual abuse in
adult facilities than do adult inmates in the same facilities or juveniles housed
in juvenile facilities.28 This abuse often begins immediately, within the first

25

See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 153, 155–57.
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–8.
27 See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 256–57 (noting that juveniles in prisons lack the opportunity to
participate in rehabilitative programming and instead spend much of their time learning new criminal
techniques from more skilled and experienced offenders).
28 MICHELE DEITCH ET AL., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, FROM TIME OUT TO HARD TIME: YOUNG
CHILDREN IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at xiv (2009), available at http://www.
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/NR_TimeOut.pdf.
26
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forty-eight hours of a juvenile’s entry into an adult facility.29 Juveniles are five
times more likely to be sexually assaulted in adult facilities than in juvenile
facilities.30 Although juveniles made up only .2% of the prison population in
2005, they made up almost 1% of the substantiated incidents of inmate-oninmate sexual violence in prisons that year.31 Juveniles constituted less than
1% of the jail population in 2005, but they made up 21% of all victims of
substantiated incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jails.32 In total,
juveniles made up 7.7% of all victims of substantiated acts of sexual violence
in prisons and jails carried out by other inmates, even though they made up less
than 1% of the total detained and incarcerated population.33
Sexual assault and rape may result in severe physical consequences,
potentially exposing the victim to HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, and other sexually
transmitted infections.34 Sexual activity between men, which constitutes the
vast majority of prison rape, accounts for more than 50% of all new HIV
infections in the United States.35 Rates of HIV and confirmed AIDS are more
than five times higher among those incarcerated in prisons than in the general
population of the United States.36
Sexual abuse has severe and long-term emotional and psychological
consequences for juveniles that may last well into adulthood.37 Sexual abuse
can lead to major depression and posttraumatic stress disorder.38 Juveniles who
have been sexually abused may face problems with anger, impulse control,
flashbacks, dissociative episodes, hopelessness, despair, and persistent distrust
and withdrawal.39 Sexual abuse can increase tendencies toward criminal

29

Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4) (2006).
Id.
31 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 155–56.
32 Id. at 155.
33 Id. at 155–56.
34 Zulficar Gregory Restum, Commentary, Public Health Implications of Substandard Correctional
Health Care, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1689, 1690 (2005).
35 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/factsheets/pdf/us_overview.pdf.
36 J. Taussig et al., HIV Transmission Among Male Inmates in a State Prison System—Georgia, 1992–
2005, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 421, 421 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
PDF/wk/mm5515.pdf.
37 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 153.
38 Id.
39 Id.
30
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behavior and substance abuse in juveniles.40 Upon release from prison, victims
of prison rape are more likely to become homeless or require government
assistance due to the physical and psychological impacts of rape than are those
who were not raped in prison.41
Congress recognized the significant risks that juveniles face in adult
facilities when it passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA).42
PREA, which unanimously passed in the House of Representatives and Senate
and was immediately enacted into law by President George W. Bush, sought to
draw attention to and address the issues of rape43 and sexual victimization of
individuals in custody.44
The findings section of PREA highlights the increased risk of rape that
juveniles face: “Young first-time offenders are at increased risk of sexual
victimization. Juveniles are 5 times more likely to be sexually assaulted in
adult rather than juvenile facilities—often within the first 48 hours of
incarceration.”45 PREA requires prison officials to keep more thorough internal
records on rape, and it created a commission to propose standards to improve
prison management.46 Although an important symbolic step, PREA has failed

40 Id.; see also DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 194972, YOUTH
VICTIMIZATION: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 9–10 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/194972.pdf.
41 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(11) (2006) (“Victims of prison rape
suffer severe physical and psychological effects that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and
maintain stable employment upon their release from prison. They are thus more likely to become homeless
and/or require government assistance.”).
42 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609).
43 The Prison Rape Elimination Act defines “rape” as the

carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person,
forcibly or against that person’s will; . . . the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with
an object, or sexual fondling of a person not forcibly or against the person’s will, where the
victim is incapable of giving consent because of his or her youth or his or her temporary or
permanent mental or physical incapacity; or . . . the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual
assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person achieved through the exploitation of the fear
or threat of physical violence or bodily injury.
Id. § 15609(9).
44 Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty of Addressing and
Eliminating Rape in Prison, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119, 122, 167 (2009).
45 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4).
46 Thompson, supra note 44, at 168 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15603(a)(1), 15606(e)(2)(L)).
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to eliminate or reduce sexual abuse in correctional facilities or to demonstrably
change public attitudes toward rape in custodial settings.47
Numerous factors contribute to why juveniles face significant dangers
when confined with adults. In a Department of Justice report that described
characteristics that make an individual more likely to be sexually abused while
incarcerated, many of the listed characteristics are common in juveniles,
including small size and inexperience with the criminal justice system.48
Additionally, juveniles, who have not fully matured physically, cognitively,
socially, or emotionally, are less capable of protecting themselves from sexual
advances and assault.49 These juveniles generally also lack the experiences to
cope in predatory environments, and expressions of fear may be taken as
indications of weakness.50
Staffing differences may also contribute to the high rates of sexual abuse in
adult detention and correctional facilities because juvenile facilities generally
have a much higher staff-to-inmate ratio than do adult facilities.51 Juvenile
detention facilities generally have a ratio of one staff member to every eight
youths, while an average adult jail has a staff-to-inmate ratio of one to sixtyfour.52 The additional staff members in juvenile facilities may provide
increased supervision and may also offer assistance and support to juveniles in
a more focused manner.53
Incidents of sexual assault in jails and prisons are underreported,54 and
juveniles may be particularly discouraged from reporting sexual abuse as a
result of developmental, emotional, and systemic barriers.55 The ramifications
of disclosure include shame, stigma, not being believed, and retaliation, which
47 See id. at 122 (citing Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of
Character, 91 IOWA L. REV. 561, 568 (2006)) (“While an important symbolic first step, the bill has occasioned
far too little discussion of implementation following its enactment. As important, there has been little or no
change in public perception of—and attitudes toward—rape in prison.”).
48 STEVEN T. MCFARLAND ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON RAPE IN JAILS IN THE U.S. 6–8 (2008),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reviewpanel/pdfs/prea_finalreport_081229.pdf.
49 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 142 (citing Telephone Interview with
Charlotte Price, Correctional Planner, N.C. Dep’t of Correction (Jan. 29, 2009)).
50 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 258.
51 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN
ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 7 (2007), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/
CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 149 (2006).
55 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 150.
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impact juveniles more significantly than adults.56 Juveniles may not be willing
to undergo the intense scrutiny needed to determine the accuracy of a report of
sexual assault.57 Once faced with formal interviews and investigation, juveniles
may feel intimidated by the perpetrator, try to suppress the pain stemming from
the abuse by denying it ever occurred, change their story, or refuse to
cooperate with investigators.58
Juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are also at a high risk of
committing suicide.59 One study indicates that a juvenile housed in an adult jail
is five times more likely to commit suicide than is a juvenile in the general
population and eight times more likely to commit suicide than is a juvenile
housed in a juvenile facility.60 Other studies suggest that a juvenile’s increased
risk of suicide in adult jails may be far higher.61
Not designed to meet the special needs of juveniles, adult facilities may
seriously compromise a juvenile’s healthy development, and surveys of adult
facilities indicate that they generally lack specialized or developmentally
appropriate programming for juveniles.62 Adult facilities are generally far less
equipped than juvenile facilities to meet the educational needs of juveniles.63
In 95% of juvenile facilities, one teacher is employed for every fifteen inmates,
in contrast to one teacher for every one hundred inmates in adult facilities.64
Unlike in adult facilities, the educational staff members in juvenile facilities
are generally full-time employees.65 In addition to an overall higher staff-toinmate ratio and more teachers, most juvenile facilities also include classroom
spaces and do not have the same physical-space restrictions faced by many
adult facilities.66 Juveniles confined in adult facilities, especially those in

56 See id.; see also id. at 152 (“Although trauma, fear of retaliation, and limited knowledge of legal rights
and procedures discourage reporting among adults, the impact of these factors on youth is even greater.”).
57 See Thompson, supra note 44, at 130–31.
58 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 152.
59 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–8.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4 (“Youth are 19 times more likely to
commit suicide in jail than youth in the general population and 36 times more likely to commit suicide in an
adult jail than in a juvenile detention facility.” (endnote omitted)).
62 See COUNCIL OF JUVENILE CORR. ADM’RS, POSITION STATEMENT: WAIVER AND TRANSFER OF YOUTHS
TO ADULT SYSTEMS (2009), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CJCA%20
Waiver%20and%20Transfer%20(2009).pdf.
63 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 7.
64 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 253.
65 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 7.
66 Id.
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pretrial detention awaiting adjudication, face a high risk of falling more behind
in their education.67
Juvenile facilities are better able to provide developmentally appropriate
healthcare, rehabilitative services, and programming than are adult facilities.68
Adult facilities may fail to provide juveniles with the appropriate nutrition or
dental and vision care, which are especially critical for developing
adolescents.69 Staff members at juvenile facilities typically receive special
training to work with juveniles not generally received by the staff at adult
facilities.70 Many adult facilities fail to provide juveniles with even basic
services, including prison-survival skills and counseling.71 In two-thirds of
juvenile facilities, one counselor is employed for every ten juveniles, and in
85% of juvenile facilities, at least one counselor is employed for every twentyfive juveniles.72 A direct comparison to the number of counselors available in
adult facilities is difficult because most adult facilities group all “professional
and technical” personnel in one category, which includes all medical and
classification staff.73 This staff-to-inmate ratio is one to twenty-five.74 Given
their incomplete development, juveniles are significantly impacted by the lack
of appropriate services and care in adult facilities.75
Juveniles’ developmental stage and malleability make them particularly
vulnerable to criminal socialization when incarcerated with adults.76 Generally
sensitive to peer pressure as a group, juveniles confined in adult facilities are
“especially likely to engage in violent behavior and to develop identities linked
to domination and control.”77 While confined in adult facilities, juveniles lack
models for building a positive identity, honing productive life skills, and
solving problems and disputes.78 Rather, juveniles may spend considerable
amounts of time with experienced adult offenders, who may pass along new

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 252–57.
See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 6–7.
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 66.
Id. at 66–67.
Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 253.
Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 254.
See id. at 252, 257–58; infra Part II.A.
See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 257–58.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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methods and techniques related to criminal activity and the avoidance of
detection.79
Juveniles may also adopt violent practices to mask their vulnerable status.80
To survive the violence they encounter in adult facilities, juveniles have
reported that they often attempt to fit in to inmate culture.81 Many juveniles
can only adjust to life in adult prisons or jails by “accepting violence as a part
of daily life and, thus, becoming even more violent.”82
A body of evidence suggests that incarcerating juveniles in adult
correctional facilities not only places the juveniles in a demonstrably more
hazardous living situation but also does not fulfill commonly accepted
purposes of punishment. Research indicates that incarcerating juveniles with
adults, an often more experienced criminal population, may neither deter
juveniles from future criminal activity nor improve public safety.83 In 2007, the
Task Force on Community Preventive Services, supported by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, systematically evaluated published studies
that dealt with the effectiveness of policies that result in the transfer of
juveniles to criminal court.84 The task force scrutinized the design suitability,
methodologies, execution, and outcomes of these studies.85
In its analysis of six studies examining specific deterrence,86 all of which
controlled for selection bias, the task force noted that four studies found that
transferred juveniles subsequently committed more violent and cumulative
crime than their counterparts who remained in the juvenile justice system.87

79 Id. at 257. “Prisons are schools for crime; offenders learn new skills for the illegitimate labor market in
prison and become more deeply enmeshed in criminal subcultures. Prison can be an embittering experience
that leaves offenders more angry at the world than when they went in.” John Braithwaite, A Future Where
Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1738 (1999).
80 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 7–8.
81 RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 220595, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE
DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
82 Id. at 8.
83 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 5–6 (citing Angela McGowan et al., Effects on
Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the
Adult Justice System: A Systematic Review, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S7, S7–28 (2007)).
84 McGowan et al., supra note 83.
85 Id. at S12.
86 Specific, or special, deterrence is the goal of punishment to dissuade an individual offender from
committing offenses in the future. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (9th ed. 2009).
87 McGowan et al., supra note 83, at S14–15. One study found no effect on the recidivism of transferred
juveniles, and one study found slightly lower recidivism rates for transferred juveniles who initially committed
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These four studies indicate that transferred juveniles were 33.7% more likely
to be re-arrested than juveniles who remained in the juvenile justice system.88
The task force concluded that “juveniles transferred to the adult justice system
have greater rates of subsequent violence than juveniles retained in the juvenile
justice system” and that “[t]ransferring juveniles to the adult justice system is
counterproductive as a strategy for deterring subsequent violence.”89 This
increase in recidivism may be partially attributable to confinement in adult
facilities, given that juveniles are held with more experienced adult offenders
and lack the rehabilitative opportunities available in juvenile facilities.90 Some
researchers have concluded that incarceration with adults may have
“brutalizing effects” on juveniles, in which the violent experiences that
juveniles witness and experience in adult facilities normalize violent and
criminal conduct.91
Research is generally inconclusive as to whether conviction in criminal
court and incarceration in adult facilities deters potential juvenile offenders.92
Most evidence indicates that transfer to criminal court and incarceration in
adult facilities has little or no general deterrent effect.93 Accordingly, an
accumulating body of evidence suggests that incarcerating juveniles in adult
facilities fails to demonstrably deter future crime, and perhaps even increases
recidivism rates in juvenile offenders, while dramatically increasing the risk of
serious harm faced by these vulnerable wards of the state.
Although some seek to justify the confinement of juveniles with adults by
pointing to the need for increased criminal sanctions for certain hardened
juvenile offenders, many juveniles who are convicted of criminal offenses and
confined in adult facilities serve sentences comparable in length to the ones
that they would have served if held in juvenile facilities.94 Seventy-eight
percent of juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are released before they turn
twenty-one; ninety-five percent are released before they turn twenty-five.95
The average time that these juveniles serve on their sentences is two years and

property offenses, although it found higher rates of recidivism for transferred juveniles arrested for all crimes
other than property offenses. Id. at S14.
88 Id.
89 Id. at S15.
90 REDDING, supra note 81, at 7; McGowan et al., supra note 83, at S19.
91 REDDING, supra note 81, at 8.
92 Id. at 2.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1–2.
95 Id.
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eight months.96 Additionally, some jurisdictions have implemented systems in
which a juvenile convicted in criminal court can serve his sentence in a
juvenile detention facility until he reaches the age of eighteen, at which time he
can be transferred to an adult facility to serve the remaining time of his
sentence if necessary.97
Juveniles housed in adult facilities face extreme risks to their health and
well-being without the benefit of developmentally appropriate services and
rehabilitative programming. Exposed to alarmingly high rates of physical and
sexual abuse, these children face the real possibility of developing
psychological and emotional disorders, contracting sexually transmitted
infections, or even committing suicide. Adult facilities, with often dramatically
lower staff-to-inmate ratios than juvenile facilities, are not equipped to handle
the special educational, developmental, physical, and emotional needs of
juveniles, and thus deprive them of critical opportunities for rehabilitation. In
fact, confinement in adult facilities may foster more violent behaviors,
facilitate opportunities for criminal socialization, and increase recidivism.
B. Numbers of Juveniles Confined in Adult Facilities
On any given day, thousands of juveniles are housed with adult offenders
in jails and prisons.98 The primary means by which a juvenile finds himself in
an adult facility is when he is prosecuted as an adult in criminal court.99
Throughout the 1990s, public fear of the juvenile “super-predator,”100
predictions about growth among certain segments of the population, and
public-safety concerns led to a movement to prosecute more juveniles in
criminal court.101 During the 1990s, nearly every state legislature expanded its

96

Id. at 2.
See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 24.
98 MINTON, supra note 11, at 9 tbl.6; WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21.
99 HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212906, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 236 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/
nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. Approximately 250,000 juveniles are prosecuted in adult court each year.
NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010
REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2011), available at http://www.
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf.
100 John DiIulio, then a professor at Princeton University, first used the term “super-predator” in 1995 to
describe what some thought to be a new emerging group of hardened, predatory, and remorseless juvenile
offenders. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at
23; see also Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice—Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
483, 486 (2009).
101 Soler et al., supra note 100, at 492.
97
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existing transfer provisions or created new transfer mechanisms that made it
easier to prosecute juveniles in criminal court.102 The number of juveniles
transferred to criminal court rose in most states, which led to their placement in
adult-detention and adult-correctional facilities while awaiting disposition and
following conviction.103 Between 1990 and 1999, the number of juveniles held
in adult jails increased by more than 300%, while the overall adult jail inmate
population only increased by 48%.104 Between 1986 and 1995, the number of
juveniles entering adult prisons also rose each year.105
Thousands of juveniles are detained and incarcerated with adults each year.
In many states, juveniles are housed with the general adult population.106 On
an annual one-day count in 2009, 7220 juveniles were confined in adult jails,
most either awaiting disposition in criminal court or serving sentences of less
than one year.107 In 2009, 2778 juveniles were incarcerated in adult prisons on
the annual one-day count of prison populations.108 Given high turnover rates,
the total number of juveniles confined in jails and prisons over the course of
one year may be ten to twenty times higher than the numbers gathered in the
one-day count.109
National consensus, however, may be forming against confining juveniles
with adults. State legislatures and prison officials are beginning to realize the
dangers of confining juveniles with adults. Between 1996 and 2004, the
number of juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons fell by 54%, even as prison

102 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 113. All states have set the upper limit of original jurisdiction
for juvenile court at the age of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. BENJAMIN ADAMS & SEAN ADDIE, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 230167, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 2007, at 1 (2010), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/230167.pdf. Three types of statutes provide for the transfer of juveniles to
criminal court: (i) judicial transfer laws that allow or require a judge to determine whether juvenile court
jurisdiction will be waived following a court hearing, (ii) prosecutorial direct-file laws that give both juvenile
and criminal courts original jurisdiction and allow the prosecutor to determine within which jurisdiction to file
the case, and (iii) automatic-transfer laws that designate certain cases that must be filed in criminal court based
on characteristics of the offense or juvenile. REDDING, supra note 81, at 2. For a comprehensive history and
analysis of transfer provisions and the waiver of juveniles to adult court, see THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000).
103 REDDING, supra note 81, at 1.
104 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 236.
105 Id. at 237.
106 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 252.
107 MINTON, supra note 11, at 9 tbl.6. Of these juveniles, 5847 were held as adults and 1373 were held as
juveniles. Id.
108 WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21.
109 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 41; CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4.
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populations grew.110 On the day of the annual count of prison inmates in 2009,
seven states did not house any juveniles in adult prisons,111 twelve states
housed between one and ten juveniles in adult prisons,112 and an additional ten
states housed between ten and twenty-five juveniles in adult prisons.113 By the
annual one-day count of adult jail inmate populations in 2011, the number of
juveniles being held in jails had declined to 5900.114 Furthermore, some states
have taken steps to require the sight-and-sound separation of juveniles and
adults when juveniles are placed in adult facilities. Of the thirty-nine states that
allow juveniles to be held in adult jails while awaiting trial in criminal court,
twenty states require that juveniles be separated from adults during this
period.115 Even states that currently house higher numbers of juveniles in adult
facilities, such as Pennsylvania,116 are beginning to take steps to decrease the
number of juveniles in their adult facilities.117
II. JUVENILES AND ADULTS: DIFFERENT AND TREATED DIFFERENTLY
As described in Part I, juvenile offenders face significantly greater dangers
when confined with adults in jails and prisons, and thousands of juveniles in
the United States face these dangers on any given day. A growing body of
evidence indicates that juveniles are significantly different from adults. The
disparity in the dangers faced by juveniles and adults when confined in adult

110

SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 237.
WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21. These states are California, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and West Virginia. Id.
112 Id. These states are Alaska (seven juveniles in adult prisons), Hawaii (two juveniles in adult prisons),
Kansas (five juveniles in adult prisons), Massachusetts (eight juveniles in adult prisons), Montana (one
juvenile in adult prisons), New Mexico (three juveniles in adult prisons), Rhode Island (one juvenile in adult
prisons), South Dakota (one juvenile in adult prisons), Utah (six juveniles in adult prisons), Vermont (four
juveniles in adult prisons), Washington (two juveniles in adult prisons), and Wyoming (one juvenile in adult
prisons). Id.
113 Id. These states are Arkansas (seventeen juveniles in adult prisons), Iowa (thirteen juveniles in adult
prisons), Louisiana (fifteen juveniles in adult prisons), Minnesota (thirteen juveniles in adult prisons),
Nebraska (twenty-one juveniles in adult prisons), New Jersey (twenty-one juveniles in adult prisons),
Oklahoma (nineteen juveniles in adult prisons), Oregon (thirteen juveniles in adult prisons), Tennessee
(twenty-two juveniles in adult prisons), and Virginia (sixteen juveniles in adult prisons). Id.
114 See TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 237961, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011—
STATISTICAL TABLES 6 tbl.6 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf.
115 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 14, 24.
116 On the day of the annual count in 2009, Pennsylvania housed sixty-one juveniles in its adult prisons.
WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21.
117 See ARYA, supra note 99, at 26. Signed into law in October 2010, Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1169
permits a juvenile being tried in the adult criminal system to be “de-certified” and held at a juvenile facility.
S.B. 1169, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010).
111
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facilities, coupled with the inherent differences between juveniles and adults,
raises important constitutional issues. A punishment that passes constitutional
muster when applied to adults may be unconstitutional when applied to
juveniles.
This Part argues that juveniles and adults demonstrate significant
differences in physical and mental development and have appropriately been
treated differently under the law. Section A describes the significant
developmental differences between juveniles and adults. Section B discusses
the treatment of juveniles under state and federal law. Section C summarizes
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving children, which highlights the
constitutionally significant differences between juveniles and adults. Section D
describes the history and purposes of the juvenile justice system, which was
created to respond to the special needs of juveniles. Section E examines
international norms surrounding the confinement of juveniles with adults.
A. Developmental Characteristics of Juveniles
Scientific research highlights many differences between juveniles and
adults that militate against confining them together.118 Although some young
people now experience the physical changes of puberty earlier than in the past,
which may result in an appearance of maturity at an earlier age, most aspects
of cognitive development, such as the development of self-regulatory capacity
and skills, reasoning ability, planning, logic, and understanding the
consequences of actions, increase according to biological (i.e., numerical) age
and experiences, rather than according to the child’s stage of physical
development.119
The sexual abuse and lack of access to programming and treatment in adult
facilities negatively affects the development of juveniles, and they are more
susceptible to harm from maltreatment than adults. Magnetic resonance
imaging indicates that a particular section of a juvenile’s frontal lobe, which
controls decision making and other advanced functions,120 is not fully
developed and continues to undergo significant change after an individual’s

118

See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8826–28 (2001).
119 Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain Development: A Period of Vulnerabilities and Opportunities, 1021
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 15, 18 (2004).
120 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 14.
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eighteenth birthday.121 In fact, research shows that the human brain continues
to develop and mature well into an individual’s twenties.122 Juveniles also have
a relatively unformed character.123 During adolescence, an individual’s identity
begins to develop and emerge, and the individual’s interactions with his
surroundings heavily influence this identity formation.124
Because a juvenile’s brain is still developing and his character has not been
fully formed, juveniles are generally capable of change.125 Developmental
psychologists emphasize that adolescence is “a period of tremendous
malleability,” in which all experiences “have a great deal of influence over the
course of development.”126 Given their development throughout adolescence,
juveniles are more amenable to change than are adults.127 Therefore, the
rehabilitative programming available in juvenile facilities may be more
effective with this malleable and responsive population.128
B. Treatment of Juveniles Under Federal and State Law
Congress and all fifty state legislatures recognize the differences between
juveniles and adults and have created laws based upon those differences. These
laws acknowledge the import of a juvenile’s continued development and seek
to protect developing juveniles from their own immaturity and lack of
responsibility.129 In 1988, Justice Stevens noted, “[W]e assume that [children]
do not yet act as adults do, and thus [society] act[s] in their interest by
restricting certain choices that we feel they are not yet ready to make with full
benefit of the costs and benefits attending such decisions.”130

121

Id.; Sowell et al., supra note 118, at 8826.
DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 14.
123 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014
(2003).
124 See id.
125 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO
DIE IN PRISON 7 (2007), available at http://eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.
126 Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000).
127 McGowan et al., supra note 83, at S8.
128 See id. at S12–20.
129 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 6.
130 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (plurality opinion). In Thompson, the Court
held the death penalty to be an unconstitutional punishment for individuals who committed the relevant
offense before the age of sixteen. Id. at 838.
122
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All states have laws that treat juveniles differently from adults, which stems
from the recognition of the many differences between juveniles and adults.131
Each state restricts juveniles’ authority and decision making by setting the age
of majority to be at least eighteen.132 Prior to reaching the age of majority, an
individual does not have the authority to vote, serve on a jury, create a binding
legal contract, purchase and possess a firearm, serve in the military, or
gamble.133 States have determined that, before the age of eighteen, juveniles do
not have the requisite decision-making capability and autonomy to initiate and
participate in these acts.
Most states also restrict a juvenile’s right to engage in certain activities
without parental or judicial consent, including getting an abortion,134 getting
married,135 purchasing pornography,136 getting a tattoo,137 or getting a body
piercing.138 All states restrict individuals under the age of twenty-one from
purchasing alcohol, and most restrict juveniles under the age of eighteen from
purchasing tobacco, getting a driver’s license without restrictions, or engaging
in transactions with pawnbrokers.139
A juvenile cannot personally bring a suit in court against another party.140
A court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a juvenile
and his interests in litigation.141 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure group
minors and incompetents together as a class that cannot sue or defend on their
own behalf.142 If a minor or incompetent does not have “a duly appointed
representative,” such as a general guardian, a conservator, or a like fiduciary,
the Rules require a next friend or a guardian ad litem “to protect a minor or

131

DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 9.
Id. at 11.
133 Id. at 10–11.
134 In thirty-nine states, a juvenile must get parental or judicial consent to get an abortion. Id. at 11.
135 In thirty-six states and the District of Columbia, a juvenile cannot get married without parental
consent. Id.
136 In forty-eight states, youth under the age of eighteen cannot purchase pornography either absolutely or
without parental consent. Id.
137 In forty-two states, a youth under eighteen is either absolutely prohibited from getting or must obtain
parental consent to get a tattoo. Id.
138 In thirty-three states, a youth under eighteen is either absolutely prohibited from getting or must obtain
parental consent to get a body piercing. Id.
139 Id.
140 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:25 (4th ed.
1993 & Supp. 2009).
141 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 25 (2010).
142 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
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incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”143 A juvenile also
generally cannot be compelled to specifically perform a contract while under
the age of eighteen.144
The federal government has recognized the differences between juveniles
and adults, and the dangers inherent in confining juveniles in facilities in which
they come into contact with adult offenders. The Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act145 (JJDPA), enacted in 1974 and most recently
reauthorized in 2002, hinges a state’s receipt of federal funding for juvenile
justice initiatives on its adherence to a number of guidelines.146 The JJDPA
prohibits the confinement of juveniles prosecuted in juvenile court in “any
institution in which they have contact with adult inmates,”147 which has come
to be known as the sight-and-sound-separation requirement.148
The JJDPA creates limited exceptions that allow for the placement of a
juvenile in an adult facility for a short period of time before or after a court
appearance, while awaiting transfer to a juvenile facility, in a rural area
without any nearby juvenile facilities, or during periods of unsafe travel
conditions.149 In each of these circumstances, the JJDPA requires that
“juveniles do not have contact with adult inmates.”150 The JJDPA also requires
that states adopt policies mandating that those who work in penal facilities
housing juveniles be “trained and certified to work with juveniles.”151 Even
though the developmental vulnerability of juveniles tried as adults remains
diminished, the JJDPA does not apply to juveniles charged and tried as
adults.152

143

Id.
See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 140.
145 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
146 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (2006).
147 Id. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
148 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 97.
149 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(13).
150 Id. § 5633(a)(13)(A), (B)(i)(I).
151 Id. § 5633(a)(13)(A), (B)(i)(II).
152 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 7; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR MONITORING FACILITIES UNDER THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 2002 § 2.5, at 17 (2010), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/
compliance/guidancemanual2010.pdf (“A juvenile who has been transferred or waived or is otherwise under
the jurisdiction of a criminal court does not have to be separated from adult criminal offenders.”).
144
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Numerous state and federal laws recognize and enforce the differences
between juveniles and adults. Through the JJDPA, Congress has specifically
highlighted how these differences implicate confining juveniles with adults.
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Juveniles
Differences between juveniles and adults have been recognized as having
both legal and scientific significance. Accordingly, the United States Supreme
Court has treated and continues to treat juveniles as a class separate from
adults.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized juveniles as developmentally
different from adults in both civil and criminal matters. Justice Frankfurter
once famously noted that “[c]hildren have a very special place in life which
law should reflect.”153 He warned that “[l]egal theories . . . readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s
duty towards children.”154 Accordingly, the Court has embraced the notion that
juveniles can and sometimes must be treated differently than adults throughout
its jurisprudence.
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court held that a state may require a pregnant minor
to get either parental or judicial consent for her reproductive choices because
minors often lack the capacity to independently make informed decisions.155
The Court noted three reasons that justified “the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults.”156 The
Court based its conclusion on “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”157 The Court opined,
“[A]lthough children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled
to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability.”158
In Bellotti, the Court noted its past holdings, in which it allowed states to
“limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of

153
154
155
156
157
158

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
443 U.S. 622, 635, 647–48 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 635.
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important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”159 The
Court characterized some of its past decisions as having been “grounded in the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
[juveniles] often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”160
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s right to
restrict a minor’s work schedule.161 In Prince, an adult guardian permitted a
child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street, which violated
the state’s child-labor statute.162 Even though the child had expressed a
personal desire to engage in this activity, which was also an exercise of
religion, the Court upheld the guardian’s conviction under the state statute
because “the interests of society to protect the welfare of children” and the
“opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and
citizens” allowed the state to enforce the statute, which would be
unconstitutional if applied to adults.163
Beginning in the 1960s, the Court expanded the due process rights of
juveniles, while still emphasizing the constitutionally significant differences
between juveniles and adults that supported differential treatment in the
juvenile and criminal justice systems. In its 1967 decision in In re Gault, the
Court expanded the procedural due process rights conferred upon juveniles in
delinquency proceedings in juvenile court.164 In its decision, the Court
extended to juveniles the right to counsel, the right to notice of the charges
brought against them, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
the right against self-incrimination.165 Even as the Court granted these rights to
juveniles, it acknowledged and affirmed the value of the rehabilitative
principles upon which the juvenile court system had been founded.166 The
Court commended the “principles relating to the processing and treatment of
juveniles separately from adults” and emphasized that the procedural issues of
the case did not in any way affect the separate processing and treatment of
juveniles.167 Juveniles who are processed in juvenile court, however, do not
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id.
Id.
321 U.S. 158, 168–70 (1944).
Id. at 161–62.
See id. at 164–65.
387 U.S. 1, 31–64 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
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receive all the same due process protections as those processed in criminal
court. For example, juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile
proceedings,168 which is a constitutional right for an individual charged with a
nonpetty crime in criminal court.169
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving juveniles has emphasized the
many constitutionally significant differences between juveniles and adults. The
Court has explicitly stated that the Constitution may apply differently to
juveniles and adults.170 Even when the Court expanded constitutional due
process rights for juveniles, the Court continued to recognize juveniles as a
class separate from adults, and juvenile proceedings and treatment as different
from adult proceedings and treatment.171
D. History of the Juvenile Justice System
The history of the juvenile justice system reflects the deeply rooted belief
in the importance of the differences between juveniles and adults in our legal
system. Since its founding, the juvenile justice system has emphasized
rehabilitation, which has not been a major focus of criminal courts. First
established in 1899, juvenile courts were created to deal separately and
differently with juveniles who committed offenses.172 Prior to 1899, children
were tried in the criminal justice system in the same manner as adult
offenders.173 Early reformers contemplated a juvenile justice system in which
youthful offenders received treatment to eliminate antisocial tendencies, and

168 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[T]rial by jury in the
juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”).
169 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right
of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee.”).
170 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (“[O]ur acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the
adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from
adults.”).
171 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
172 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 5. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899. Id. The
act that established this court

stressed that the court should serve a rehabilitative, rather than punitive, purpose; created a
provision that juvenile court records be maintained confidentially and separately from criminal
records to minimize stigma; mandated the physical separation of youths from adults when
incarcerated or placed in the same institution; and included a provision barring the detention of
children under the age of twelve in jails under any circumstances.
Id. at 5–6.
173 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at ix.
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the newly created juvenile system rejected concepts of criminal responsibility
and punishment.174
By 1925, forty-six states and the District of Columbia had established
separate juvenile court systems.175 Based on the notion that juveniles are
different from adults, these courts focused on treating and rehabilitating a child
with a clinical, rather than punitive, focus guiding the process from initial
apprehension through institutionalization.176 Juvenile courts sought to facilitate
nonadversarial proceedings, during which the judge and other participants
determined the best methods to rehabilitate the youthful offender.177
Beginning in the 1960s, the juvenile justice system faced criticism and
underwent considerable change.178 Despite changes and additions to the body
of due process standards applying to juvenile court proceedings,179 all states
continue to maintain a juvenile court system separate from the criminal justice
system that provides independent courts and facilities to process juveniles.180
Juvenile courts generally continue to embrace rehabilitation as a necessary
response to the delinquent behavior of youthful offenders.181 Juvenile detention
facilities generally provide more programming and treatment, with a
rehabilitative focus, than adult facilities.182 Experts continue to emphasize the
recent psychological and neurological studies that demonstrate the critical need
to offer rehabilitative services to young offenders.183

174 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime,
FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 16.
175 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 6.
176 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–16.
177 Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus
Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2009).
178 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 174, at 17.
179 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31–64; Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 560–63 (1966).
180 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 106.
181 Henning, supra note 177, at 1112. “While most [state juvenile court codes’] purpose clauses still
manifest a commitment to the rehabilitation of children, those clauses now also reflect a growing concern for
the interests of victims, the accountability of the offending youth, the safety of the community, and sometimes
even the punishment of the child.” Id. at 1113–14. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(2) (2009)
(“Consistent with the protection of the public interest, remove from children committing delinquent acts the
taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior and substitute . . . a program of treatment,
training and rehabilitation . . . .”).
182 See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 142.
183 Henning, supra note 177, at 1118–19.
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Because the majority of juveniles detained or incarcerated in adult facilities
are either awaiting disposition in criminal court or serving sentences after
conviction in criminal court, research focused on the challenges faced by
juveniles transferred to criminal court illuminates several age-related
differences that may also be relevant to incarcerating juveniles with adults.
Research on juveniles tried as adults shows that juveniles face unique risks in
the adult criminal justice system.184 Juveniles are particularly susceptible to
coercive interrogation techniques because of their diminished status in relation
to the adults who interrogate them, beliefs about the need to obey authority
figures, dependence on adults, and particular vulnerability to intimidation.185
Accordingly, the danger that juveniles will give false confessions is higher,
which seriously compromises the fact-finding process.186 Juveniles have a
decreased understanding of their rights, difficulties comprehending the trial
process, limited language skills, and inadequate decision-making abilities, all
of which may compromise their experience in and the ultimate outcome of
their processing in the criminal justice system.187
These age-related deficits implicate the Eighth Amendment because they
render juveniles as a class more vulnerable to coercion, less capable of
defending themselves against abuse, more subject to peer pressure, more
vulnerable to criminal socialization, and less capable of surviving in the hostile
jail and prison environments dominated by adult inmates. The United States
has long recognized that the differences between juveniles and adults require
separate processing and treatment for juvenile offenders. The continued
existence of juvenile courts and juvenile-detention and correctional facilities
underscores the widespread recognition that the developmental needs of
juveniles require different and more rehabilitative treatment than adult
offenders.
E. International Norms Involving the Confinement of Juveniles with Adults
Many states’ allowance of the confinement of juveniles with adults deviates
from international norms; both international bodies and numerous countries
throughout the world eschew the incarceration of juveniles with adults.188 The
184

EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 125, at 8.
Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in the United
States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177, 180–81, 184–89 (1996).
185
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United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child189 (CRC), the primary
international document that lays out the rights of children who come into
contact with the law,190 recognizes that children’s unique status grants them
special protection.191 The CRC notes that “[n]o child shall be subjected to
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”192 The
CRC discourages holding children in any type of detention or correctional
facility.193 The CRC further states, “Every child deprived of liberty shall be
treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her
age.”194 If a period of detention does occur, the CRC emphasizes the critical
importance of separating juveniles from adults.195
Countries throughout the world have rejected the incarceration of juveniles
with adults. Great Britain does not incarcerate children under the age of
eighteen with adults.196 Rather, facilities designated especially for juveniles
house all children under the age of eighteen, regardless of their offense.197
Following its ratification of the CRC in 1993, New Zealand prohibited the
incarceration of children under the age of seventeen in adult facilities.198 In
Sweden, individuals under the age of twenty may not be incarcerated in adult
facilities.199 In its Bill of Rights, the South African constitution forbids the
incarceration of any children under the age of eighteen with adults.200

189 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
190 Baird & Samuels, supra note 188, at 184. The CRC was unanimously adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on November 20, 1989. Id. The United States has not ratified the CRC, even though both
the House of Representatives and Senate passed resolutions supporting it. Id. at 185.
191 Deborah Labelle, Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 79, 118 (2008).
192 CRC, supra note 189, art. 37(a).
193 See id. art. 37(b) (“The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child . . . shall be used only as a measure
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time . . . .”).
194 Id. art. 37(c).
195 See id. (“[E]very child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the
child’s best interest not to do so . . . .”).
196 Anthony Bottoms & James Dignan, Youth Justice in Great Britain, 31 CRIME & JUST. 21, 89 (2004).
Once a young offender in Britain reaches the age of twelve, he may be given a detention and training order
(DTO) that may last between four and twenty-four months. Id. The first half of the DTO is served in custody
with other juveniles, and the second half is served in the community with supervision. Id.
197 Id. at 90–91.
198 Allison Morris, Youth Justice in New Zealand, 31 CRIME & JUST. 243, 285–86 (2004).
199 Carl-Gunnar Janson, Youth Justice in Sweden, 31 CRIME & JUST. 391, 419 (2004).
200 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 28(g).
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A large body of scientific research demonstrates the many developmental
differences between juveniles and adults. State governments, Congress, and the
United States Supreme Court have consistently and traditionally recognized
that these differences implicate the treatment of juveniles under the law. In
fact, the existence of a juvenile court system in every jurisdiction in the United
States reflects this understanding that children should generally be treated
differently from adults. International norms also recognize the significant
differences between juveniles and adults, and international bodies and many
countries reject the confinement of juveniles with adults.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The previous Part considered the ways in which the law treats juveniles and
adults differently and some of the underlying justifications for this differential
treatment. The existence and legal recognition of these differences raise
important constitutional issues with respect to whether housing juveniles with
adults violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and
unusual punishment.”201 This Part begins by describing the development of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and then explores the
Court’s creation of categorical rules against specific sentencing practices as
applied to certain offenders, including two types of punishment that have been
found to violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to juveniles: the death
penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
nonhomicide offenses. This Part then examines a recent decision in which the
Court relied upon the principles in these categorical-rule cases to again
conclude that juveniles’ distinctive characteristics affect the constitutionality of
sentencing practices as applied to them.
201 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment applies to individuals following an adjudication of guilt. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664,
671 n.40 (1977). Prior to formal adjudication, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee individuals’ rights in relation to the criminal justice process, including pretrial
conditions of confinement. See id. at 671–72 n.40; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979).
Pretrial detainees may not be subjected to pre-adjudicatory detention conditions that amount to punishment.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. The Supreme Court has noted that pretrial detainees’ substantive due process claims
regarding conditions of confinement must receive at the least the same level of protection as claims brought
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 545; see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244
(1983). The majority of circuits utilize Eighth Amendment standards to determine whether pretrial detainees
face violation of their substantive due process rights. David C. Gorlin, Note, Evaluating Punishment in
Purgatory: The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement Claims from Inadequate
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 421–22 (2009). This Comment will use Eighth
Amendment standards to consider challenges to conditions of confinement for juveniles being held before and
after conviction.
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The Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions are incisive: “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”202 The Eighth Amendment is incorporated against the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.203
Section A presents an overview of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence regarding cruel and unusual punishment. Section B examines the
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis when it develops a categorical rule that
prohibits a particular group from receiving a particular punishment. Section C
examines how the Court has drawn upon these categorical-rule cases to further
limit sentencing practices as applied to juveniles.
A. Overview
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”204 At
its most basic level, the Eighth Amendment forbids “the imposition of
inherently barbaric punishments,” such as torture, “under all circumstances.”205
The Supreme Court has long recognized that what constitutes “cruel and
unusual punishment” is “not static” and “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”206
This “evolving standards of decency” assessment is built on the notion that
society changes, and therefore, determinations about the cruel and unusual
nature of punishments also change. The Court has noted that the Eighth
Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against which we must evaluate penal
measures.”207
The reach of the Eighth Amendment extends beyond “inherently barbaric”
punishments to punishments that are disproportionate to a crime.208 The
Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment.”209 The ban on cruel and unusual punishment embodies a
“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and

202

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
204 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
205 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
206 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
207 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
208 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
209 Id.
203
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proportioned to [the] offense.”210 The concept of proportionality demands that
criminal sanctions consider both the offender and harm.211 Cases in which the
Court has examined proportionality generally fall into one of two categories:
those in which it assessed a term-of-years sentence in light of all the
circumstances of the case and those in which it categorically restricted certain
punishments.212 In the first category of cases,213 the Court made a threshold
comparison of the offense and severity of the sentence to determine whether a
specific term of years was a grossly disproportionate sentence for an individual
defendant.214 If the Court inferred gross disproportionality, it then compared
imposed sentences in the same and other jurisdictions.215 More on the second
category of cases will follow.
Although the Court has generally focused on whether criminal sanctions
violate the Eighth Amendment,216 the Court has acknowledged that specific
conditions of confinement may also fall under the purview of the Eighth

210

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 174, at 19.
212 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
213 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Court held that a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole as applied to a defendant convicted of passing a worthless check, his
seventh nonviolent offense, violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 279, 281, 303.
214 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
215 Id.
216 Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 884
(2009). Scholars and even Supreme Court Justices disagree on what constitutes punishment for Eighth
Amendment purposes. Traditional definitions of punishment generally contemplate only the legal
consequences of a criminal conviction. John Rawls offered an oft-quoted definition of punishment in 1955:
211

[A] person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal
rights of a citizen on the ground that he has violated a rule of law, the violation having been
established by trial according to the due process of law, provided that the deprivation is carried
out by the recognized legal authorities of the state, that the rule of law clearly specifies both the
offense and the attached penalty, that the courts construe statutes strictly, and that the statute was
on the books prior to the time of the offense. This definition specifies what I shall understand by
punishment.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10 (1955) (footnote omitted). Some scholars urge the
adoption of a conception of punishment that assesses whether harm stems from the state’s response to a
criminal conviction, which would encompass most conditions of confinement. See Ristroph, supra note 54, at
168 (“The ‘penal’ status of an act or practice should depend not on specific legislative designation or
individual intent, but on whether the act or practice is a necessary element or direct consequence of the state’s
response to an individual’s criminal conviction.”); see also Dolovich, supra, at 908 (“Any harm people
experience while incarcerated should therefore be cognizable under the Eighth Amendment if it is traceable to
state-created conditions of confinement.”).
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Amendment.217 Despite the use of a highly restrictive test,218 the Court has
deemed that the Eighth Amendment may not only constrain the criminal
penalty but also govern prison officials’ administration of otherwise
constitutional penalties.219 The Court has found that the protection afforded an
inmate “against other inmates” constitutes a “conditio[n] of confinement”
subject to the Eighth Amendment.220 The Court has held that denial of medical
care could constitute cruel and unusual punishment because it could result in
pain and suffering unrelated to penological goals.221 In addition, prison
conditions that “increase violence among inmates or create other conditions
intolerable for prison confinement” might constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.222 The Court has also acknowledged that sexual assaults in
correctional facilities may be covered by the Eighth Amendment.223
B. The Creation of Eighth Amendment Categorical Rules
The second category of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis involves those cases in which the Court established
categorical rules about what punishments are cruel and unusual when applied
to an entire category of offenders or to certain offenses.224 In two such cases,
Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, the Court utilized this analysis to
217 The Supreme Court first acknowledged that prison conditions could constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment in its 1976 decision in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Dolovich, supra note 216, at 889.
The Court has been hesitant, however, to deem that all conditions of confinement constitute punishment for
Eighth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“The Eighth
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”).
218 Under the Court’s two-pronged test for conditions-of-confinement cases, a prisoner must objectively
establish that he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991),
which in a failure-to-prevent-harm claim requires a showing from the prisoner that his conditions of
confinement “pos[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, the prisoner must
show that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, which requires a
showing of the official’s actual knowledge of the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official
cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement
unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”).
219 For example, the Court has held that certain means of administering the death penalty would violate
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, including burning on the stake, crucifixion, or breaking on
the wheel. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); Dolovich, supra note 216, at 884–85.
220 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
221 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103–04.
222 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).
223 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832–34.
224 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

WOOD GALLEYS3

2012]

8/24/2012 1:36 PM

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

1475

hold that certain punishments violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to
juveniles under the age of eighteen.225
1. Overview
The Court has adopted a two-part analytical framework to assess whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual when applied to a certain category of
offenders or to certain offenses.226 The Court first examines the “‘objective
indicia of society’s standards . . . ’ to determine whether there is a national
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”227 Then, “guided by ‘the
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history,
meaning, and purpose,’” the Court determines if the punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment through “the exercise of its own independent judgment.”228
Thus far, the Court’s own understanding and interpretation, the second prong
of the analysis, has not diverged from its assessment of national consensus.229
Scholars have noted, however, that “[t]he possibility exists . . . that judicial
judgment will someday diverge from public opinion concerning punishment
for given crimes.”230
The Court also considers the laws of other countries and international
authorities in its Eighth Amendment categorical-rule analysis. Although the
Court emphasizes that international norms are not dispositive in its decision
making, the Court has considered them “instructive for its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment[]”231 since its decision in Trop v. Dulles in 1958, in which
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited Congress from stripping
a native-born American citizen of his citizenship after a criminal conviction.232
In its consideration of international norms, the Court has lent particular
credence to the laws of Great Britain233 and other Western European
225 The Court noted that the creation of categorical rules required line drawing, and it justified its selection
of the age of eighteen as “the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
226 See, e.g., id. at 564.
227 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 563).
228 Id. (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421).
229 William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving
Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1380 (2005).
230 Id. at 1381.
231 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
232 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
233 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (“The United Kingdom’s experience bears particular relevance here
in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins.”).
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countries.234 In addition to considering the uniformity of other countries’ laws
involving certain punishments,235 the Court has considered the CRC236 and the
decisions and statements of other international bodies in supporting its Eighth
Amendment decisions.237
2. Cruel and Unusual: The Death Penalty for Juveniles (Roper v.
Simmons)
In its decision in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court categorically
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles who committed
offenses while under the age of eighteen as an Eighth Amendment violation.238
The Court concluded that juvenile offenders are “categorically less culpable”
than adult offenders, and therefore, the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles is disproportionate to their offenses because of their decreased
culpability as a class.239 The Roper Court situated its decision in the line of
cases that categorically prohibited certain punishments as unconstitutional
when applied to certain categories of offenders or to certain offenses. The
Court compared its analysis, findings, and ultimate decision to its decision in
Atkins v. Virginia,240 in which the Court held that the imposition of the death
penalty on mentally retarded defendants constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.241
The facts of Roper v. Simmons are disturbing. At the age of seventeen,
Christopher Simmons planned and executed the murder of a woman by tying
up her hands and feet with electrical wire, wrapping her face in duct tape, and
throwing her off a bridge into a river, where she subsequently drowned.242
234 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion). In its decision in
Thompson, the plurality looked particularly to “other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,
and . . . leading members of the Western European community.” Id.
235 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (“[O]nly seven countries other than the United States have executed
juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and China.”).
236 See, e.g., id. at 576 (noting that the CRC condemns imposing capital punishment on juveniles under
the age of eighteen).
237 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78; Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–18 n.21 (2002); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
796–97 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion); and Trop, 356 U.S.
at 102–03).
238 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
239 Id. at 561, 564–75 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation mark omitted).
240 536 U.S. 304.
241 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–64 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–20).
242 Id. at 556–57.
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Afterwards, Simmons bragged to his friends about his actions, and following
his arrest, he confessed to the murder.243 Nine months later, Simmons was tried
as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to death.244
The Supreme Court noted that, even when a juvenile commits “a heinous
crime,” such as the one committed by Christopher Simmons, “the State cannot
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own
humanity.”245 The Court had previously held the death penalty to be an
unconstitutional punishment for individuals who committed death-eligible
offenses before the age of sixteen.246 In Roper, the Court extended its
reasoning about culpability and proportionality to sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds, even though the facts of the murder were particularly disturbing and
Simmons was nearly eighteen at the time of the offense.
In reaching its holding, the Court utilized the framework it adopted in its
Eighth Amendment categorical-rule cases. First, the Court concluded that
national consensus reflected a rejection of the death penalty for offenses
committed prior to an individual’s eighteenth birthday.247 The Court focused
on legislative enactments in the states, the actual imposition of the death
penalty on juveniles, and the consistency in the trend toward abolishing the
practice.248 The Court found that juveniles were excluded from receiving the
death penalty in eighteen of the states that permitted the death penalty, either
through “express provision or judicial interpretation.”249 To reach the
conclusion that “[a] majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile offenders,” the Court also added the twelve states that had
abolished the death penalty entirely to the eighteen states that specifically
prohibited its imposition on juveniles.250 The Court concluded that society
viewed juveniles as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”251
The Court then exercised its independent judicial judgment and reasoned
that the death penalty should not be applied to juvenile offenders.252 In this

243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Id. at 557.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 573–74.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 564, 568.
Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 568–75.
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analysis, the Court adopted a notable view of adolescent development. The
Court described three general differences between juveniles and adults, and it
characterized these differences as “marked and well understood.”253 First, the
Court noted that “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults” and that “[t]hese
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”254
The Court pointed to laws in almost every state that prohibit children under the
age of eighteen from voting, serving on juries, or getting married without
parental consent as evidence of the states’ recognition of this immaturity and
lack of responsibility.255 The Court further stated that “juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure.”256 Finally, the Court asserted, “[T]he character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”257 The Court also opined, “[N]either
retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the
death penalty on juvenile offenders.”258
Although the Court noted that international norms were not controlling, it
devoted an entire section of its opinion to a consideration of these norms as
related to the juvenile death penalty.259 The Court specifically discussed the
CRC’s rejection of capital punishment for juveniles, even though the United
States has not ratified the treaty.260 The Court also lent particular weight to
Great Britain’s prohibition of the juvenile death penalty “in light of the historic
ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own
origins.”261
The Court ultimately concluded that juveniles cannot be considered among
the worst offenders and that acts committed by a juvenile are less morally
reprehensible than those committed by an adult.262 The Court ruled that the
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to juveniles as a class,
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even though the punishment remained constitutional as applied to adults. Five
years later, the Court expanded its Eighth Amendment categorical-rule analysis
to deem a noncapital punishment unconstitutional when applied to a broad
category of juvenile offenders.
3. Cruel and Unusual: Life-Without-the-Possibility-of-Parole Sentences for
Juveniles Convicted of Nonhomicide Offenses (Graham v. Florida)
In May 2010, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, in which it
prohibited a category of offenders, juveniles, from receiving a certain
punishment, life in prison without the possibility of parole, for nonhomicide
offenses.263 Noting that it was forging a new path, the Court situated the case
in the line of categorical-rule cases that had previously only involved the death
penalty.264 The Graham Court adopted the two-part analytical framework
utilized in these cases to reach its holding that a specific term-of-years
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment when applied to a juvenile convicted
of a nonhomicide offense.265
At the age of sixteen, Terrance Jamar Graham pled guilty to armed
burglary and attempted armed robbery, after he and three accomplices
attempted to rob a restaurant.266 No money was taken, but one of Graham’s
accomplices hit the manager twice in the back of the head with a metal bar, for
which the manager received stitches.267 The judge accepted Graham’s guilty
plea, withheld adjudication, and sentenced Graham to concurrent three-year
terms of probation, the first twelve months of which Graham was supposed to
spend in a county jail.268 Six months after being released, Graham was arrested
for an armed home invasion.269 The trial court found Graham guilty of the
earlier armed burglary and attempted armed robbery charges and sentenced
him to life imprisonment plus fifteen years.270 Because Florida had abolished
its parole system, this life sentence effectively resulted in a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole.271
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The Court noted that Graham’s case “involve[d] an issue the Court ha[d]
not considered previously.”272 The Court characterized the case, however, as
one “implicat[ing] a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class
of offenders who have committed a range of crimes.”273 Therefore, the Court
rejected a threshold comparison between the severity of the penalty and the
gravity of the crime and adopted the method of analysis used in cases adopting
a categorical approach, including Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v. Simmons, and
Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which it considered the national consensus on the
punishment and then utilized independent judicial discretion in assessing
whether the punishment is cruel and unusual.274
The Graham Court first considered the objective indicia of national
consensus.275 The Court concluded that a national consensus had developed
that juveniles should not be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for nonhomicide offenses, even though the federal government and
thirty-seven of fifty states permitted that punishment.276 The Court found
national consensus by looking to actual sentencing practices, and it noted that
only twelve jurisdictions actually sentenced juvenile offenders convicted of
nonhomicide crimes to life in prison without the possibility of parole.277 The
Court reasoned that those states with laws that allowed for sentences of life in
prison without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders but rarely imposed
such sentences merely failed to distinguish between juveniles and adults in
their laws.278 At the time of the decision, 109 juveniles were serving such
sentences across the country.279 Unlike Atkins and Roper, in which the Court
considered jury-imposed capital punishment, the Graham Court’s finding of
national consensus rested on its consideration of “a modus operandi among
expert officials, including sentencing commissioners, prosecutors, and
judges.”280
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Id. at 2022–23.
274 Id. at 2023.
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276 See id. at 2049 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The additional reality that 37 out of 50 States (a
supermajority of 74%) permit the practice makes the claim utterly implausible. Not only is there no consensus
against this penalty, there is a clear legislative consensus in favor of its availability.”).
277 Id. at 2024 (majority opinion).
278 Id. at 2025.
279 Id. at 2023.
280 Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 369
(2011).
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Although the Court determined that consensus existed, it noted that
“[c]ommunity consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself
determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”281 The Court
then moved to the second prong of its analysis, in which it exercised its
independent judicial judgment, which “require[d] consideration of the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics.”282 Some scholars suggest that the Graham Court “appears to
have been motivated primarily by its independent judgment analysis.”283
In its exercise of judicial judgment, the Court repeatedly cited Roper and
emphasized the many differences between juveniles and adults. The Graham
Court characterized a key concept in Roper as being “that because juveniles
have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments.”284 The Court restated and affirmed its conclusions about
adolescent development and culpability from Roper: “No recent data provide
reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of
juveniles.”285 The Court further stated that “developments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds.”286 The Court noted that a juvenile “should not be deprived of the
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human
worth and potential.”287
The Court also considered the penological justifications for sentencing a
juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court noted that
“[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature
disproportionate to the offense.”288 The Court concluded that none of the
legitimate penological justifications, including retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, provided an “adequate” justification for the
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide
juvenile offenders.289 In its discussion of rehabilitation, the Court stated that
juvenile offenders are “most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation” and that
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Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)).
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“the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the
disproportionality of the sentence all the more evident.”290
Like in Roper, the Graham Court devoted an entire section to a
consideration of international norms surrounding the sentencing practice in
question.291 Although the Court emphasized that the decisions of other
countries “are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment,” it
stressed the relevance of international consensus against the sentencing
practice being considered.292 The Court found only eleven countries that
allowed for the possibility of life in prison without parole for juvenile
offenders and that only the United States and Israel actually imposed the
punishment.293 The Court also took note of the values espoused in the CRC,
which forbids life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders.294
In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court utilized a two-part analytical
framework to determine that certain punishments violate the Eighth
Amendment as applied to juveniles. In both decisions, the Court relied heavily
on scientific and psychological evidence that demonstrates the fundamental
differences between juveniles and adults. The Court deemed juveniles
categorically less culpable and held that certain punishments were
unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders.
C. Relying on Categorical-Rule Cases to Hold Mandatory Life-WithoutParole Sentencing Schemes Unconstitutional for Juveniles (Miller v.
Alabama)
In June 2012, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama,295 in which it
held that mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes violate the Eighth
Amendment when applied to juveniles.296 Although the Court did not opt to
use its two-part analytical framework and decide the case by adopting a
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Id. at 2030.
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295 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
296 Id. at 2475. The cases before the Court involved two fourteen-year-old defendants who were sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole following convictions for murder under mandatory
sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas. Id. at 2460–63. Under each of these sentencing schemes, the
sentencing authority lacked the ability to make any individualized determination regarding the sentence. Id.
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categorical ban, its decision heavily drew upon the analysis and fundamental
principles in its categorical-rule cases, especially Roper and Graham.297 In
fact, the Miller Court declared that the majority’s reasoning in Graham served
as “the foundation stone of [its] analysis.”298 The Court’s decision ultimately
rested on this line of categorical-rule cases and another line of precedent in
which the Court required individualized sentencing for defendants facing the
death penalty.299
In assessing its categorical-rule cases, the Miller Court focused on those
cases involving juvenile offenders. Throughout its opinion, the Court
repeatedly referenced Roper and Graham and emphasized the reasoning in
those cases, especially as it pertained to the distinctive characteristics of
juveniles. In fact, the Court concluded that the science and social science that
supported its decisions in Roper and Graham had become stronger since it
reached those decisions.300 The Court reiterated many of its previous
conclusions regarding juvenile development, including juveniles’ capacity for
positive change and decreased culpability.301 The Court’s assessment that
Roper and Graham established that “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing” appeared to be at the heart of its
reasoning.302
The Court also explicitly separated its prior decisions that contemplated
juveniles from those decisions that did not.303 The Court seemed to suggest that
any prior decisions that did not specifically contemplate juveniles would not
necessarily apply to them.304 In responding to arguments that its holding in
Harmelin v. Michigan305 precluded its holding in Miller, the Court asserted that
“Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its
holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.”306 The Court stressed that it
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Id. at 2460–69.
Id. at 2464 n.4.
299 Id. at 2463–64 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976)).
300 Id. at 2464 n.5.
301 Id. at 2464–65.
302 Id. at 2464.
303 See id. 2469–70.
304 See id.
305 501 U.S. 957 (1991). In its consideration of a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine, the Harmelin Court concluded that “a sentence
which is not otherwise cruel and unusual [does not] become[] so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’” Id. at 995.
306 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
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had “now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for
adults may not be so for children.”307
The Court refused to limit its reasoning in Roper or Graham regarding the
specific characteristics of juveniles to particular crimes: “[N]one of what [the
Court] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”308 The Court
stressed that youth “is a moment and ‘condition of life when a person may be
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.’”309
In its analysis, the Court also emphasized the importance of assessing
whether the imposition of a particular punishment on a juvenile fulfills any
purpose of punishment.310 The Court considered retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation in turn and concluded that none supported
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.311 The Court again emphasized the
importance of the possibility of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders in light of
children’s “capacity for change.”312 The Court used the stated differences
between juveniles and adults to stress that juveniles “are less deserving of the
most severe punishments.”313 The Court summarized much of its reasoning by
concluding: “Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”314
Although not necessary to the Court’s analysis, as it would have been if the
Court had adopted a categorical rule, the Miller Court considered the states’
legislative enactments regarding life-without-parole sentencing schemes.315 At
the time Miller was decided, twenty-eight states and the federal government
permitted at least some juveniles to be sentenced to mandatory life without
parole.316 The Court concluded that these numbers constituted a weaker case
307

Id.
Id. at 2465.
309 Id. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
310 See id. at 2465 (“Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit
terrible crimes.”).
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313 Id. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)) (internal quotation mark
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than the numbers presented in Graham, where the Court “prohibited lifewithout-parole terms for juveniles committing nonhomicide offenses even
though 39 jurisdictions permitted that sentence.”317 The Court also pointed to
the categorical-rule decisions involving capital punishment, including Atkins,
Roper, and Thompson, in which it categorically prohibited the death penalty in
situations where less than 50% of the states that allowed capital punishment
did so.318 In addition, the Court noted that it was “impossible to say whether a
legislature had endorsed a given penalty for children (or would do so if
presented with the choice)” when the application of at least two entirely
different statutory provisions resulted in the sentencing practice in question.319
The Court left the door open to a future decision that might adopt a
categorical rule banning life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. The Court
noted that it did not even “consider . . . [the] alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for
juveniles,” because the mandatory sentencing schemes before the Court
disregarded “youth (and all that accompanies it) . . . [, which] poses too great a
risk of disproportionate punishment.”320 The Court’s decision in Miller
reaffirms the Court’s commitment to considering a defendant’s youth and the
purposes of punishment in determining the constitutionality of sentencing
schemes as applied to juveniles. In short, the Court’s decision in Miller
emphasizes that youth matters in sentencing.
IV. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: CONFINING JUVENILES WITH ADULTS
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment categorical-rule cases provide an
analytical framework for assessing the constitutionality of the confinement of
juveniles with adults, which implicates “a particular type of sentence as it
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of
crimes.”321 When assessing whether the confinement of juveniles with adults
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court should adopt the method of analysis
used in these categorical-rule cases, because its decision would require
determining the constitutionality of the application of a certain punishment—
confinement with adults—on a certain category of offenders—juveniles. The
Court’s 2010 decision in Graham opens the door to the use of this analytical
317
318
319
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framework in the consideration of punishments other than the death penalty.
Like in Graham, the Court’s evaluation of confinement with adults would
evaluate the practices of expert officials and sentencing commissioners, rather
than jury decisions. The Court’s reasoning in Miller further supports that youth
and its associated characteristics are critical to evaluating the constitutionality
of sentencing schemes as applied to juveniles.
Under the analytical framework utilized in the Court’s categorical-rule
cases, which takes into consideration the fact that a maturing society has
evolving standards of decency,322 the Court would first consider the objective
indicia of national consensus.323 An evaluation of the objective indicia of
consensus indicates that states are moving away from confining juveniles with
adults.
The number of juveniles being held in prisons and jails nationally has
declined since 2000. On the annual one-day count of prison inmates in 2000,
3896 juveniles were incarcerated in state prisons throughout the United
States.324 On the day of the 2009 count, the number of juveniles incarcerated in
state prisons had decreased to 2778.325 In 2000, 7615 juveniles were held in
jails throughout the country on the annual one-day count of jail inmate
populations.326 On the annual one-day count in 2011, the number of juveniles
being held in adult jails had declined to 5900.327 Those states that currently
house higher numbers of juveniles in adult facilities, such as Pennsylvania,328
have recently started taking steps to decrease the juvenile population in their
adult facilities. Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1169, signed into law in October of
2010, permits a juvenile being tried in the adult criminal system to be “decertified” and held in a juvenile facility.329
In determining whether a majority of states reject the confinement of
juveniles with adults, the Court should evaluate the number of states that
prohibit confining juveniles and adults in the same facility along with the
number of states that require sight-and-sound separation between all juvenile
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See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005).
See supra Part III.B.1.
324 WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 217675, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 2006, at 4 tbl.7 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf.
325 WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21.
326 See MINTON, supra note 114, at 6 tbl.6.
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and adult inmates confined in the same facility.330 In 2009, seven states did not
house any juveniles in adult prisons,331 twelve states housed ten or fewer
juveniles in adult prisons,332 and ten states housed fewer than twenty-five
juveniles in adult prisons.333 Among the states that continue to confine
juveniles in adult facilities, some require sight-and-sound separation between
the juveniles and adults.334 Of the thirty-nine states that allow juveniles to be
held in adult jails while awaiting trial in criminal court, twenty require that
juveniles be separated from adults during this period.335 National consensus
against confining juveniles with adults in prisons and jails continues to grow,
and a majority of states now appear to reject this punishment.
After its consideration of the national consensus, the Court would then
move to the next step in the categorical-rule analysis and exercise independent
judicial discretion to assess whether confining juveniles alongside adults
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.336 Juveniles face significant dangers
to their safety and well-being, including alarmingly high rates of physical
abuse, sexual assault, and suicide, when confined with adults in jails and
prisons.337 The many physical, developmental, and psychological differences
between juveniles and adults, already recognized by the Supreme Court in
numerous decisions, make incarceration with adults an unconstitutional
punishment for children under the age of eighteen.338 Adult facilities are
generally not equipped to handle the special developmental needs of juveniles,

330 Further research is necessary to determine the nature of the state laws that govern the confinement of
children in adult facilities. In Miller, the Court emphasized the difficulty of determining legislative intent for a
particular sentencing scheme when the application of at least two entirely different statutory provisions result
in the sentencing practice in question. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2472–73 (2012). In fact, the
Miller Court noted that “most States do not have separate penalty provisions for . . . juvenile offenders.” Id. at
2473. In some states, the confinement of juveniles in adult facilities may result from the policies and practices
of prison officials, rather than legislation, making it virtually impossible to know whether the legislature
deliberately and expressly endorses the confinement of children with adults. In passing certain legislation, the
State may not intend to subject juvenile offenders to this punishment.
331 WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21. These states are California, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and West Virginia. Id.
332 Id. These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
333 Id. These states are Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Virginia. Id.
334 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 14, 24.
335 Id.
336 See supra Part III.B.1.
337 See supra Part I.A.
338 See supra Part II.A.
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including those related to their physical, emotional, and educational wellbeing.339
Any legitimate penological goals of confining juveniles with adults do not
adequately justify the punishment. Confinement with adults may actually
increase recidivism for juveniles, and evidence of any general deterrence is
lacking.340 The Supreme Court’s statements in Graham, that juvenile offenders
“are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation” and that “the absence of
rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the
sentence all the more evident,” are particularly relevant when examining the
confinement of juveniles with adults, given the stark differences between adult
and juvenile facilities.341
An examination of international norms supports the conclusion that the
confinement of juveniles with adults constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.342 The CRC, the standards of which the Supreme Court
considered in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, discourages the
incarceration of children343 and notes the critical importance of separating
juveniles from adults during any periods of confinement that do occur.344
Article 37(c) of the CRC states, “[E]very child deprived of liberty shall be
separated from adults unless it is considered in the child’s best interest not to
do so.”345 European countries, including Great Britain and Sweden, do not
incarcerate children under the age of eighteen with adults.346 Other countries,
including South Africa and New Zealand, also prohibit the confinement of
juveniles with adults under any circumstances.347 Based on the weight of the
scientific evidence and international sources of law, two factors the Court has
relied upon in past cases to formulate its own independent judgment on a
punishment, the Court is likely to find that confining juveniles with adults
violates the Eighth Amendment under the second prong of its analysis.
Using the analytical framework laid out in its Eighth Amendment
categorical-rule cases, including Roper and Graham, and the fundamental
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See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); see also supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.E.
CRC, supra note 189, art. 37(b).
Id. art. 37(c).
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principles laid out in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court
should hold that incarcerating juveniles with adults violates the Eighth
Amendment. To correct the constitutional violations that occur upon
incarcerating juveniles with adults and remedy the dangers inherent in such an
arrangement, children under the age of eighteen should be confined only in
facilities designated exclusively for juveniles, regardless of whether their cases
are heard in juvenile or criminal court.348
States may deal with the confinement of youthful offenders in a variety of
ways. Some jurisdictions have adopted a form of blended sentencing that
allows a juvenile adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court to continue his
sentence even after aging out of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.349 In some
states, juveniles who are convicted in criminal court serve their sentences in
juvenile facilities until the age of eighteen, at which time a hearing is held to
determine their optimal placement, which may continue to be the juvenile
facility or may be an adult facility.350
When a separate juvenile facility is not available for a juvenile that must be
confined, juveniles placed in adult facilities must be separated from adult
inmates, such that adults and juveniles can neither see nor hear one another.351
If a state does not currently have space to adequately house juveniles in
facilities designated solely for them, a state must ensure that juveniles remain
completely separated from the adult population. This option, however, is not
ideal and may result in many negative outcomes for juveniles.352

348 Although housing juveniles in juvenile-detention and juvenile-correctional facilities is a necessary step
to ensure compliance with the Eighth Amendment, it is not sufficient to ensure that the constitutional rights of
juveniles are being upheld. Studies of the conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities have uncovered
problems and deficiencies that must also be addressed. See, e.g., DALE G. PARENT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES (1994),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/1FrontMat.pdf.
349 See Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note
102, at 145. Blended sentencing allows for the combination of the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative focus
with the criminal justice system’s focus on criminal sanctions. Id. at 146. Blended sentencing may “provide[] a
solution to the correctional programming problem of an influx of juveniles into adult correctional systems ill
equipped to handle their special needs.” Id. at 147.
350 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 24.
351 The JJDPA requires sight-and-sound separation for all juveniles with cases pending or adjudicated in
juvenile court. See supra Part II.B.
352 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4, 7. Juveniles in adult facilities may be housed in
isolation, without any meaningful human contact, which can have devastating psychological and emotional
consequences. Id. at 4. Juveniles in isolation also may not be able to take advantage of even the limited
programming offered in an adult facility. Id. at 7; see also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 258.
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CONCLUSION
Confining juveniles with adults violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Juveniles, recognized by the
Supreme Court as being developmentally different from adults and having
diminished culpability, face grave dangers when confined with adults in
prisons and jails. In Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v.
Alabama, the Court expounded upon the many differences between juveniles
and adults. In Roper and Graham, the Court held that juveniles’ diminished
culpability as a class warranted the establishment of bright-line rules against
capital punishment and life in prison without the possibility of parole for the
nonhomicide conviction of a juvenile, respectively. Similarly, juveniles’
diminished culpability, along with the unfulfilled penological goal of
deterrence, merits a bright-line rule preventing the confinement of juveniles
with adults in prisons and jails. Given the significant and known dangers faced
by juveniles confined in adult facilities, the confinement of juveniles with
adults violates the Eighth Amendment.
Although this Comment does not argue for the elimination of the transfer
of juveniles to criminal court, it does assert that even when juveniles are tried
in criminal court, the Constitution prohibits the confinement of juveniles with
adults. Although sight-and-sound separation from adults in prisons and jails
would be less likely to violate the Eighth Amendment, it is not an ideal
solution and still presents significant risks, especially stemming from the
dangers of solitary confinement for juveniles.353
Accordingly, whenever possible, juveniles should be housed in juvenile
facilities at least until they reach the age of eighteen. States should begin to
prepare for increased numbers of juveniles that will need to be confined in
juvenile facilities if the Supreme Court holds the confinement of juveniles with
adults to be unconstitutional. The ultimate solution, however, will be for states
to adopt policies and programs that decrease the confinement of juveniles in all
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detention and correctional facilities, and that promote nonresidential
supervision, programs, and intervention whenever appropriate.354
ANDREA WOOD∗

354 Such nonresidential options might include evidence-based family-intervention models, such as
multisystemic therapy or functional family therapy; career preparation and vocational training programs, such
as YouthBuild; mentoring programs; cognitive-behavioral-skills trainings; or focused mental health and
substance-abuse-treatment programs. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR
KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 16–19, 30 (2011), available at http://www.
aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids
_Full.pdf.
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